Equifax's IT department ran a series of scans that were supposed to identify unpatched systems on March 15 there were in fact multiple vulnerable systems, including the aforementioned web portal, but the scans seemed to have not worked, and none of the vulnerable systems were flagged or patched.
On March 7, the Apache Software Foundation released a patch for the vulnerabilities on March 9, Equifax administrators were told to apply the patch to any affected systems, but the employee who should have done so didn't. If attackers sent HTTP requests with malicious code tucked into the content-type header, Struts could be tricked into executing that code, and potentially opening up the system Struts was running on to further intrusion. In that month, a vulnerability, dubbed CVE-2017-5638, was discovered in Apache Struts, an open source development framework for creating enterprise Java applications that Equifax, along with thousands of other websites, uses. To understand how exactly all these crises intersected, let's take a look at how the events unfolded.
The company was initially hacked via a consumer complaint web portal, with the attackers using a widely known vulnerability that should have been patched but, due to failures in Equifax's internal processes, wasn't.A top-level picture of how the Equifax data breach happened looks like this: General Accounting Office, and an in-depth analysis from Bloomberg Businessweek based on sources inside the investigation. Most of the discussion in this section and the subsequent one comes from two documents: A detailed report from the U.S.
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